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I. Introduction
Polarization is a phenomenon that has attracted an increasing amount of attention
recently, both in Economics and in other social sciences. While it appears to be widely
acknowledged that, in the context of income distributions, polarization has to do with
the “disappearing middle class” (Wolfson, 1994, p. 353), a precise definition of the term
has remained elusive. There are similarities to the notion of income inequality because
certain mean-preserving spreads are typically assumed to increase both inequality and
polarization. But there is more to polarization than that. In order to formalize the
concept, society needs to be partitioned into groups with strong group identification and
clear differentiation between groups.
Love and Wolfson (1976) introduced the concept of polarization into the study of
income inequality in order to focus on the issue of a disappearing middle class. In later
papers, Wolfson (1994, 1997) formalized the concept and introduced a specific measure
of polarization, crediting some earlier unpublished joint work with James Foster. This
notion of polarization divided people into two groups: those with incomes below and
those with incomes above the median income. The measure increases with clustering
of incomes within groups and with the difference of the mean income between groups.
Wang and Tsui (2000) have described these concepts with two axioms called Increased
Bipolarity and Increased Spread.
Esteban and Ray (1994) proposed a measure of polarization based on the notions
of within group identification and intergroup alienation. They introduced a series of
axioms that have a similar intent to the Foster-Wolfson axioms but have some important
differences. They emphasized that polarization is related to the ability of a society to
cooperatively make and implement group decisions. Esteban and Ray (1999) present a
model of conflict in which the degree of polarization is related to the equilibrium level of
conflict. Schultz (1996) uses a political economy model of public good provision to show
that polarized preferences of political parties result in inefficient equilibria that do not
reveal private information.
Existing measures of polarization have been applied empirically in many countries.
The polarization of income distributions and its causes have been studied in Spain by
Grad´ın (2000, 2002), in Italy by D’Ambrosio (2001), and in China by Zhang and Kanbur
(2001). Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) present polarization estimates for the income
distributions of 21 countries taken from the Luxembourg Income Study. Seshanna and
Decornez (2003) study polarization for the distribution of income across countries in the
world. Ravallion and Chen (1997) estimate Foster-Wolfson polarization indices for 67
developing and transitional economies.
We adopt an ordinal approach and, in addition to a basic anonymity requirement,
introduce two axioms that are intended to capture the spirit of polarization as described
by Wolfson (1994), Esteban and Ray (1994), and Wang and Tsui (2000).
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One of these is stated in terms of Pigou-Dalton transfers of income. An income transfer
from a person with a higher income to a person with a lower income that maintains their
pairwise ranking is a simple Pigou-Dalton transfer. The first of the Foster-Wolfson axioms
requires that a simple Pigou-Dalton transfer involving two individuals on the same side of
the median does not decrease polarization, provided that the median is the same before
and after the transfer.
The second axiom is a dominance property. Suppose two income distributions x and
y with the same median are such that all individuals below the median are no richer in y
than in x and all individuals above the median are no poorer in y than in x. The axiom
requires that y is at least as polarized as x.
Note that both of these axioms are rather weak because their conclusions are condi-
tional on the medians of the distributions to be compared being the same. This raises
the questions whether more demanding axioms could be employed in order to rank more
pairs of distributions and whether more general notions of group identification than that
induced by the median could be defined. We will provide examples illustrating that this
cannot be done easily and only at the expense of having to give up much of the intuitive
appeal of the weaker axioms.
We prove three main results. First, we characterize the polarization quasi-orderings
presented by Wolfson (1994) and refined by Wang and Tsui (2000) in terms of the gen-
eralized Lorenz quasi-ordering. We then move on to polarization measures which are
real-valued representations of polarization orderings. In our second theorem, we identify
all polarization measures satisfying suitably formulated versions of the axioms used in
our first result. Third, we characterize all polarization measures that satisfy our basic
axioms and an independence condition.
Our first result is a complete characterization of the class of polarization quasi-orderings
that satisfy anonymity and the two axioms outlined above. This class is given by all su-
persets of the relation that is obtained by the conjunction of the generalized Lorenz
quasi-orderings applied to the distributions below and above the median, conditional on
the median being the same in two distributions to be ranked.
After identifying this class of polarization quasi-orderings, we examine polarization
measures. We show that our axioms impose natural curvature and monotonicity prop-
erties on a polarization measure. Adding an independence property that requires the
subgroup of those with incomes below (above) the median to be separable from its com-
plement allows us to characterize an intuitively appealing class of polarization measures
whose members can be interpreted as combinations of inequality-averse aggregators de-
fined for the two groups.
Our characterization results are formulated for the specific case of two groups where
the criterion used for the partitions is the median of the income distribution. It is natural
to ask whether our setting can be generalized. We examine the possibilities of extending
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the basic axioms by allowing for a larger number of groups or for movements of individuals
across the dividing line. Unfortunately, it turns out that appealing versions of the axioms
are too weak to obtain the clear and transparent structure obtained for the basic model,
and stronger axioms that would allow us to extend our results are far from intuitive.
Clearly, the method chosen to partition the population into groups is crucial for the
plausibility of the resulting framework for measuring polarization. We examine the most
obvious candidates for defining these groups and illustrate by means of some simple
examples that all of them—including the median-based partition—lead to environments
where the two fundamental axioms do not appear to have strong intuitive appeal. We
conclude that the current approach to polarization based on intra-group coherence and
inter-group differences may not be the best way of capturing many social phenomena
involving notions of polarization.
II. Preliminaries
Suppose there are n ≥ 2 individuals in a society. For simplicity, we assume that
the population size n is even to avoid ambiguities when partitioning the population
on the basis of the median income. Denote the income vector of an economy by x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n
++ with xi the positive income of person i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}. We
denote an income vector with xi ≤ xi+1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} by x↑ = (x[1], . . . , x[n]).
The median income for the income vector x is denoted by m(x) and the mean income is
denoted by µ(x). For any positive integer r, we use 1r to denote the vector consisting of
r ones.
An income vector y can be obtained from an income vector x through a simple Pigou-
Dalton transfer if there exists an amount δ > 0 and two individuals i and j in N such
that yi = xi + δ < xj − δ = yj . Define the set SPD to be the set of all income pairs
(y, x) such that y can be obtained from x by a simple Pigou-Dalton transfer.
The notion of a Pigou-Dalton transfer is closely related to the Lorenz criterion. Define
the Lorenz function L:Rn ×N → R by
L(x, k) =
k∑
i=1
x[i] (2.1)
for all k ∈ N . The Lorenz quasi-ordering L applies to distributions with equal means
only and is defined as follows. For all x, y ∈ Rn such that µ(x) = µ(y),
y L x ⇔ L(y, k) ≥ L(x, k) ∀k ∈ N. (2.2)
A basic property of the Lorenz quasi-ordering is that, for any pair of income vectors with
the same mean, y L x if and only if y can be obtained from x by a sequence each
element of which is a permutation or a simple Pigou-Dalton transfer.
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Shorrocks (1983) introduced the generalized Lorenz quasi-ordering GL to extend the
Lorenz criterion to pairs of income distributions whose means are not necessarily the
same. It is defined as follows. For all x, y ∈ Rn,
y GL x ⇔ L(y, k) ≥ L(x, k) ∀k ∈ N. (2.3)
The difference between the Lorenz criterion and its generalized counterpart is that the
former applies to distributions with identical means only, whereas the latter is capable
of ranking vectors with different means as well. Both are based on the Lorenz function
L. The generalized Lorenz criterion is equivalent to second-order stochastic dominance.
Clearly, the Lorenz quasi-ordering and the generalized Lorenz quasi-ordering agree on all
pairs of income vectors with the same mean. If the means of two income vectors differ,
then the generalized Lorenz ranking will depend on the Lorenz ranking and a comparison
of the means.
III. Axioms for Polarization Quasi-Orderings
A polarization quasi-ordering is a reflexive and transitive binary relation P defined
on income distributions. Thus, y P x means that income distribution y ∈ R
n
++ is at
least as polarized as income vector x ∈ Rn++. If P is representable by a real-valued
function P :Rn++ → R, we refer to P as a polarization measure.
We begin with an anonymity axiom that ensures that a polarization quasi-ordering
only depends on incomes and ignores the identities of the individuals.
Anonymity (A): For all x, y ∈ Rn++, if y is a permutation of x, then y P x and
x P y.
The foundation for polarization is a partition of society into identifiable groups. We
follow Wolfson (1994) in dividing the population into a low-income group with incomes
below the median income and a high-income group with incomes above the median.
Letting xL = (x[1], . . . , x[n/2]) ∈ R
n/2
++ denote the rank-ordered income vector of the
low-income individuals and xH = (x[n/2+1], . . . , x[n]) ∈ R
n/2
++ the rank-ordered vector
composed of the high-income individuals, the partition of the income vector x induced
by the median into the low-income group and the high-income group is (xL, xH).
We characterize polarization quasi-orderings in terms of within-group Pigou-Dalton
transfers and between-group spread. The axioms we employ are analogous to the axioms
of Increased Bipolarity and Increased Spread, respectively, of Wang and Tsui (2000).
The Within Group Clustering axiom (WGC) requires that polarization does not de-
crease as a consequence of a simple Pigou-Dalton transfer between a pair of individuals
who are in the same group. A progressive transfer between two people on the same side
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of the median will cause a mean-preserving contraction of the distribution of income for
the group. In these cases, incomes are being clustered around the group mean income.
The axiom requires that such a change in the distribution will not decrease polarization.
The idea is that a clustering of incomes either above or below the median will increase
the similarity and hence the cohesion of the group; see Figure 1.
Within-Group Clustering (WGC): For all x, y ∈ Rn++ such that m(x) = m(y),
(i) if (yL, xL) ∈ SPD and yH = xH , then y P x;
(ii) if (yH , xH) ∈ SPD and yL = xL, then y P x.
Income
People
1 2 3 4
1
2
Income
People
1 2 3 4
1
2
Distribution x Distribution y
Figure 1x. Figure 1y.
The Between-Group Spread axiom (BGS) requires that a polarization measure does
not decrease if those below the median become (weakly) worse off and those above the
median become (weakly) better off. This move (weakly) decreases the low-group mean
and (weakly) increases the high-group mean. Since the two group means move further
apart, polarization does not decrease.
Between-Group Spread (BGS): For all x, y ∈ Rn++ such that m(x) = m(y), if y
L ≤
xL and yH ≥ xH , then y P x.
Figure 2 displays an income change as in the axiom statement. BGS implies that this
change does not decrease polarization.
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Figure 2x. Figure 2y.
IV. Existing Polarization Measures
Wolfson (1994), crediting unpublished work in collaboration with James Foster, pro-
posed a polarization measure PFW that is defined as follows. For all x ∈ R
n
++,
PFW (x) =
2µ(x)
m(x)
[(
µ(xH)− µ(xL)
)
µ(x)
−G(x)
]
(4.1)
where G:Rn++ → R is the Gini inequality index. This measure has an interesting geo-
metrical connection to the Lorenz curve that is explored in Wolfson (1994).
Esteban and Ray (1994) assume that a polarization measure has an additive repre-
sentation based on intragroup identification and intergroup alienation. Their assumption
regarding the functional form of the index is a strong requirement that severely restricts
the set of admissible polarization measures. With their axioms and this assumption,
they derive a class of polarization measures that are closely linked to the Gini index
when applied to groups rather than individuals. To define their measures, we require
more notation. For x ∈ Rn++, let K(x) ∈ N be the number of distinct incomes in dis-
tribution x. Furthermore, let ξ(x) = (ξ1(x), . . . , ξK(x)(x)) be the vector of these distinct
incomes and let pi(x) = (pi1(x), . . . , piK(x)(x)) be the vector of population shares with the
corresponding income. That is, pik(x) is the proportion of individuals in N with income
ξk(x). Esteban and Ray’s (1994) class of measures P
α
ER is defined by
PαER(x) =
1
2µ(x)
K(x)∑
k=1
K(x)∑
ℓ=1
pik(x)
1+αpiℓ(x)|ξk(x)− ξℓ(x)| (4.2)
for all x ∈ Rn++, where α ∈ (0, 1.6] is a parameter. The index approaches the Gini
index defined in terms of income groups as α approaches zero. For larger values of α,
polarization differs from an inequality measure as required by the axioms.
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Esteban, Grad´ın, and Ray (2007) introduced a modification of the earlier Esteban and
Ray (1994) measure to incorporate an error in grouping people into the required discrete
groups. Their measure is a generalization of both the Esteban and Ray (1994) measure
and the Foster-Wolfson measure. The additive structure employed by Esteban and Ray
(1994) is preserved.
Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004) measured polarization for continuous rather than
discrete distributions and proposed a suitable framework for a sampling theory. These
measures can be viewed as continuous analogues of those introduced in the discrete setting
by Esteban and Ray. As in Esteban and Ray (1994), polarization is assumed to be
proportional to the “sum” of effective antagonisms.
Wang and Tsui (2000) proposed a generalized Foster-Wolfson measure of polarization
that satisfies their axioms of Increased Bipolarity and Increased Spread. In addition
to imposing these axioms, they restricted themselves to polarization measures that are
additive in rank-ordered individual incomes. Specifically, they required that a polarization
measure P can be written as
P (x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
aix[i] (4.3)
for all x ∈ Rn++, with constants ai ∈ R for all i ∈ N . They demonstrated that the only
polarization measures with this representation that satisfy their axioms and a normaliza-
tion are given by
PWT (x) =
n∑
i=1
ai
∣∣∣∣m(x)− x[i]m(x)
∣∣∣∣ (4.4)
for all x ∈ Rn++, where the coefficients are such that 0 < −ai < −ai+1 for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n/2 − 1} and ai > ai+1 > 0 for all i ∈ {n/2 + 1, . . . , n − 1}. Furthermore, they
demonstrated that the Foster-Wolfson measure is a special case of this formulation.
There are alternatives to the additive structure shared by the above-described mea-
sures. For instance, Chakravarty and Majumder (2001) discuss polarization measures
that are linked to specific classes of inequality measures and that do not satisfy the
stringent additivity requirements as formulated above.
V. A Class of Polarization Quasi-Orderings
We now identify the class of polarization quasi-orderings that satisfy our three ax-
ioms. They can be expressed in terms of the generalized Lorenz criterion, restricted to
comparisons of vectors with the same median. Specifically, we prove that all polarization
quasi-orderings satisfying the axioms are supersets of a quasi-ordering 0 that is defined
in terms of the generalized Lorenz quasi-ordering.
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Theorem 1: A polarization quasi-ordering P satisfies A, WGC, and BGS if and only
if 0⊆ P where
y 0 x ⇔ m(x) = m(y) and − y
L GL −x
L and yH GL x
H . (5.1)
for all x, y ∈ Rn++.
Proof: If. Suppose 0⊆ P .
That A is satisfied by P follows immediately by definition.
To prove that P satisfies WGC, let x, y ∈ R
n
++ be such that m(x) = m(y). To establish
part (i), suppose (yL, xL) ∈ SPD and yH = xH . This implies
yL L x
L (5.2)
and, by definition of the Lorenz criterion,
−yL L −x
L. (5.3)
Because µ(yL) = µ(xL), we obtain
−yL GL −x
L. (5.4)
Moreover,
yH GL x
H (5.5)
because GL is reflexive. Hence, y 0 x and, because 0⊆ P by assumption, we obtain
y P x. Part (ii) is proven analogously.
To establish BGS, suppose x, y ∈ Rn++ are such that m(x) = m(y), y
L ≤ xL, and
yH ≥ xH . This implies
−yL ≥ −xL (5.6)
and, thus,
−yL GL −x
L and yH GL x
H . (5.7)
By definition, y 0 x and hence y P x.
Only if. Suppose P satisfies A, WGC, and BGS, and let x, y ∈ R
n
++ be such that
y 0 x. We have to prove that y P x. By definition of 0, we have m(x) = m(y),
−yL GL −x
L, and yH GL x
H . Define zL1 = x
L
1 +
∑n/2
i=1 y
L
i −
∑n/2
i=1 x
L
i and z
L
i = x
L
i for
all i ∈ {2, . . . , n/2}. Because −yL GL −x
L, it follows that
n/2∑
i=1
−yLi −
n/2∑
i=1
−xLi ≥ 0 (5.8)
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and, thus,
zL1 = x
L
1 +
n/2∑
i=1
yLi −
n/2∑
i=1
xLi ≤ x
L
1 (5.9)
so that
zL ≤ xL. (5.10)
Furthermore,
n/2∑
i=k
−zLi =
n/2∑
i=k
−xLi ≤
n/2∑
i=k
−yLi ∀k ∈ {2, . . . , n/2} (5.11)
and
n/2∑
i=1
−zLi = −x
L
1 +
n/2∑
i=1
−yLi +
n/2∑
i=1
xLi +
n/2∑
i=2
−xLi =
n/2∑
i=1
−yLi . (5.12)
Because the rank-order of the components of −zL and −yL is the reverse of the rank-order
of those of zL and yL, it follows that
−yL L −z
L (5.13)
and thus
yL L z
L. (5.14)
Analogously, define zHn/2 = x
H
n/2 +
∑n/2
i=1 y
H
i −
∑n/2
i=1 x
H
i and z
H
i = x
H
i for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n/2− 1}. Because yH GL x
H , it follows that
n/2∑
i=1
yHi −
n/2∑
i=1
xHi ≥ 0 (5.15)
and, thus,
zHn/2 = x
H
n/2 +
n/2∑
i=1
yHi −
n/2∑
i=1
xHi ≥ x
H
n/2 (5.16)
so that
zH ≥ xH . (5.17)
Furthermore,
k∑
i=1
zHi =
k∑
i=1
xHi ≤
k∑
i=1
yHi ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n/2− 1} (5.18)
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and
n/2∑
i=1
zHi =
n/2−1∑
i=1
xHi + x
H
n/2 +
n/2∑
i=1
yHi −
n/2∑
i=2
xHi =
n/2∑
i=1
yHi (5.19)
so that
yH L z
H . (5.20)
By (5.10), (5.17), and BGS, z P x. By (5.14), (5.20), repeated application of A or
WGC, and transitivity,
y = (yL, yH) P (z
L, yH) and (zL, yH) P (z
L, zH ) = z (5.21)
and the transitivity of P implies y P x.
Wolfson (1994) defined the Foster-Wolfson polarization quasi-ordering in terms of in-
come distribution functions with common medians. Wang and Tsui (2000) presented the
following definition in terms of the income vectors. For any two income distributions
x, y ∈ Rn++ such that m(x) = m(y) =M ,
y FW x ⇔
n/2∑
i=k
(M − xi) ≤
n/2∑
i=k
(M − yi) ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n/2}
and
k∑
i=n/2+1
(xi −M) ≤
k∑
i=n/2+1
(yi −M) ∀k ∈ {n/2 + 1, . . . , n}.
(5.22)
Simple algebra establishes that 0 =FW when the quasi-orderings are restricted to
comparisons involving the same median and, thus, an alternative way of characterizing
the quasi-orderings of Theorem 1 is to describe them as supersets of the Foster-Wolfson
quasi-ordering. Thus, we obtain
Corollary 1.1: 0 =FW .
VI. A Class of Polarization Measures
Suppose that P is representable by a polarization measure P :R
n
++ → R (which
implies, in particular, that P is an ordering and not merely a quasi-ordering). We
now examine the consequences of our axioms in terms of monotonicity and curvature
properties of P . The relevant curvature property is S-concavity; see Marshall and Olkin
(1979). Clearly, A, WGC, and BGS can be expressed as properties of P by replacing
every occurrence of the term “y P x” with “P (y) ≥ P (x).” For any M ∈ R++, let
DM = {x ∈ R
n
++ | m(x) = M}. Furthermore, let PM :DM → R be the restriction of P
to DM . We obtain
10
Theorem 2: A polarization measure P satisfies A, WGC, and BGS if and only if, for all
M ∈ R++, PM is non-increasing and S-concave in x
L and non-decreasing and S-concave
in xH .
Proof: If. Suppose PM is non-increasing and S-concave in x
L and non-decreasing and
S-concave in xH for all M ∈ R++.
As is well-known, A is implied by S-concavity.
To show that part (i) of WGC is satisfied, suppose x, y ∈ DM are such that (y
L, xL) ∈
SPD and yH = xH . This implies
P (y) = PM (y
L, yH) ≥ PM (x
L, yH) = PM (x
L, xH) = P (x) (6.1)
because PM is S-concave in x
L. Part (ii) of WGC is proven analogously.
Now suppose x, y ∈ Rn++ are such that m(x) = m(y) = M , y
L ≤ xL, and yH ≥ xH .
Because PM is non-increasing in x
L and non-decreasing in xH , it follows immediately
that
P (y) = PM (y) ≥ PM (x) = P (x) (6.2)
and BGS is satisfied.
Only if. Suppose P satisfies A, WGC, and BGS.
We first establish that PM must be S-concave in x
L for all M ∈ R++. Consider any
x = (xL, xH) ∈ DM and any bistochastic (n/2)× (n/2) matrix B. By the properties of
a bistochastic matrix (see, for instance, Marshall and Olkin, 1979), BxL can be reached
from xL through a finite sequence of simple Pigou-Dalton transfers or permutations.
Therefore, there exist K ∈ N and z0, . . . , zK ∈ R
n/2
++ such that Bx
L = z0, (zk−1, zk) ∈
SPD or zk is a permutation of zk−1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, and zK = xL. Moreover, by
definition, m(zk, xH) = M for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By repeated application of A or part
(i) of WGC,
PM (Bx
L, xH) = P (BxL, xH) = P (z0, xH) ≥ . . . ≥ P (zK , xH) = P (xL, xH) = PM (x
L, xH)
(6.3)
and, thus, PM is S-concave in x
L. That PM is S-concave in x
H follows from replacing
part (i) with part (ii) of WGC in the above argument.
That PM is non-increasing in x
L and non-decreasing in xH follows immediately from
BGS.
We now add an independence property to our list of axioms in order to obtain po-
larization as a function that can be expressed in terms of two functions—one applied to
xL and one applied to xH . For any fixed value of the median, the independence axiom
requires that xL is strictly separable from its complement xH in P and, conversely, xH is
strictly separable from xL in P ; see Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978, Chapter 3).
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Independence (IND): For all x, y ∈ Rn++ such that m(x) = m(y),
(i) P (yL, yH) ≥ P (xL, yH) ⇔ P (yL, xH) ≥ P (xL, xH);
(ii) P (yL, yH) ≥ P (yL, xH) ⇔ P (xL, yH) ≥ P (xL, xH).
To illustrate that the axiom merely is a slight strengthening of a restricted version
that is already implied by our other properties, we note that the variant of IND suitably
defined for a polarization quasi-ordering is implied by A, WGC, and BGS on the decisive
set for the quasi-ordering 0. To see that this is the case, define
Ω = { (x, y) | y 0 x or x 0 y } . (6.4)
This immediately yields the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1: A polarization quasi-ordering P satisfying A, WGC, and BGS satisfies
IND on Ω.
While the independence axiom is satisfied on this subset of Rn++ × R
n
++, the result
cannot be extended to the complete space. The independence property is implied by the
independence of the minimal quasi-order 0 but need not hold for any completion of 0.
Therefore, any polarization measure need not satisfy the independence axiom on the full
domain. Our independence axiom extends the independence property to the full domain
and enables us to obtain simpler functional representations.
Theorem 3: A polarization measure P satisfies A, WGC, BGS, and IND if and only
if, for all M ∈ R++, there exist an increasing function ΦM :R
2 → R, a non-increasing
and S-concave function φLM :R
n/2
++ → R, and a non-decreasing and S-concave function
φHM :R
n/2
++ → R such that, for all M ∈ R++ and for all x ∈ DM ,
PM (x
L, xH) = ΦM
(
φLM (x
L), φHM (x
H)
)
. (6.5)
Proof: If. Let M ∈ R++ and suppose PM is given by (6.5). That A, WGC, and BGS
are satisfied follows as in Theorem 2. Part (i) of IND is established by noting that (6.5)
implies
P (yL, yH) ≥ P (xL, yH)⇔ PM (y
L, yH) ≥ PM (x
L, yH)
⇔ ΦM
(
φLM (y
L), φHM (y
H)
)
≥ ΦM
(
φLM (x
L), φHM(y
H)
)
⇔ φLM (y
L) ≥ φLM (x
L)
(6.6)
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because ΦM is increasing and, analogously,
P (yL, xH) ≥ P (xL, xH)⇔ PM (y
L, xH) ≥ PM (x
L, xH)
⇔ ΦM
(
φLM (y
L), φHM (x
H)
)
≥ ΦM
(
φLM (x
L), φHM (x
H)
)
⇔ φLM (y
L) ≥ φLM (x
L).
(6.7)
Combining the two equivalences establishes (i). The proof of (ii) is analogous.
Only if. Suppose P satisfies A, WGC, BGS, and IND. LetM ∈ R++. By Theorem 2, PM
is non-increasing and S-concave in xL and non-decreasing and S-concave in xH . Fix an
arbitrary y¯H > M and define φLM (y
L) = PM (y
L, y¯H) for all yL. φLM is non-increasing and
S-concave because PM is non-increasing and S-concave in x
L. Analogously, fix y¯L < M
and let φHM (y
H) = PM (y¯
L, yH) for all yH . φLM is non-increasing and S-concave because
PM is non-increasing and S-concave in x
L, and φHM is non-decreasing and S-concave
because PM is non-decreasing and S-concave in x
H . Now define ΦM (φ
L
M (y
L), φHM (y
H)) =
PM (y
L, yH). To see that ΦLM is increasing in its first argument, use the definitions of φ
L
M
and ΦM and IND to obtain
φLM (y
L) > φLM (x
L)⇔ PM (y
L, y¯H) > PM (x
L, y¯H)
⇔ PM (y
L, yH) > PM (x
L, yH)
⇔ ΦM
(
φLM (y
L), φHM (y
H)
)
> ΦM
(
φLM (x
L), φHM (y
H)
)
.
(6.8)
That ΦM is increasing in its second argument is shown analogously.
The function φHM can be interpreted as an inequality-sensitive welfare indicator for
the high-income group and, analogously, φLM has the properties of an inequality-sensitive
reverse welfare indicator defined for the subdistribution below the median. Thus, The-
orem 3 provides an intuitive representation of polarization as an aggregate of these two
components.
VII. Multiple Groups and Variable Population
A first natural extension of our framework is to allow for more than two groups in
assessing polarization. The extent to which the between-group spread axiom can be
generalized to that setting in a natural fashion is rather limited, even if the partition
of the population into groups is clear-cut and uncontroversial (see the next section for a
discussion of the grouping issue). While the monotonicity property expressed by between-
group spread generalizes naturally to the lowest-income and highest-income groups, there
is no plausible analogue for groups in between the two extremes.
Suppose n = 6, x = (12, (2−ε)12, 312) and y = (12, (2+ε)12, 312), where ε ∈ (0, 1/2);
see Figure 3. Three groups are identified according to the vertical dotted lines. The
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Figure 3x. Figure 3y.
middle-group income vector has increased in the move from x to y but there is no reason
to declare one of the two distributions more polarized than the other.
As a consequence of this observation, the effect of increasing or decreasing the incomes
of the members of an intermediate group is not limited to the dominance considerations
underlying a similar move at the extremes, and the dominance effects cannot be disentan-
gled from distributional effects. This prevents us from extending the clear-cut separation
of the two groups to a multi-group environment.
Similar problems arise if we attempt to generalize our model by making the axioms
apply to situations where individuals may move from one side of the median to the
other. Esteban and Ray (1994) suggest that, abstracting from other considerations, the
more equal the cardinalities of the two groups are, the more polarized society is. Again,
this effect cannot be disentangled from distributional and dominance effects, except in
very limited circumstances that do not allow us to generalize the results of our theorems
adequately. Consider the two-group case and suppose there are more individuals in
the high-income group than in the low-income group. Suppose an individual in the high-
income group falls below the median in the move from one distribution to another, all else
unchanged. Clearly, this move is not necessarily distributionally neutral for both groups
(actually, it is rather unlikely that this case occurs), which introduces a first ambiguity.
Moreover, the move increases total income in the low-income group and decreases total
income in the high-income group, which would tend to decrease polarization on dominance
grounds. Thus, there is no reason to believe that such a move towards equalization of
the sizes of the two groups increases polarization. As is the case for the multi-group
extension discussed above, the impossibility of disentangling the effects of such a move
across the median line prevents us from formulating a plausible axiom that would take us
anywhere near a class of measures where the relative size of the groups is an additional
independent determinant of polarization.
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VIII. Defining Groups
While our basic axioms are plausible and appealing if there are two well-defined groups
before and after the change in the income distribution considered in the respective axiom,
the underlying intuition does not survive when trying to apply analogous reasoning to
distributions where the division into groups is not as clear-cut. This observation applies
not only to the median-based or quantile-based model considered here, but to more
general notions of group definitions.
Consider first a division of the population according to some criterion that is inde-
pendent of the variable studied (in our case, income)—for example, we may partition the
population into males and females. In that case, the notion of polarization examined here
(and in the current literature) does not seem to be suitable.
Suppose we have a population of two men and two women. In distribution x, both
men have an income of 2 and the incomes of the women are 1 and 3. If, in income
distribution y, the incomes of the men are unchanged and both women have an income
of 2, y can be obtained from x by means of a simple Pigou-Dalton transfer among the
women and, if the axiom within-group clustering is adopted in this setting, y should be
at least as polarized than x. However, everyone is the same in y, and this situation is
associated with a minimal degree of polarization, and the appeal of WGC appears to be
highly questionable. See Figure 4 for an illustration.
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Figure 4x. Figure 4y.
Between-group spread does not fare any better in this setting. Clearly, there is no
reason to believe that polarization should be increasing in the incomes of one group and
decreasing in the incomes of the other if these groups are defined independently of the
distribution under consideration.
A first alternative to an independent definition of a partition is to use a fixed income
level y0 to separate the population into two groups. Suppose the low-income group is
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defined as the set of those with incomes below y0 and the high-income group consists of
the individuals with income y0 or higher (the group to which a person at y0 is assigned
is arbitrary and does not affect our discussion in any way).
Suppose there are four individuals and y0 = 3. In distribution x, incomes are (1, 1, 3−
ε, 3 + ε) with ε > 0 small. Now consider the distribution y = (1, 2 − ε, 2, 3 + ε). y is
obtained from x via a simple Pigou-Dalton transfer among the low-income recipients, and
WGC demands a weak increase in polarization. But this seems very counter-intuitive;
see Figure 5.
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Figure 5x. Figure 5y.
Now consider BGS. As before, suppose n = 4 and y0 = 3. Let x = (1, 1, 2, 3 + ε) and
y = (1, 1, 3 − ε, 3 + ε). BGS requires that y is at most as polarized than x but, again,
this does not conform to our intuition regarding the relative polarization ranking of the
two distributions. See Figure 6 for an illustration of this example.
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Figure 6x. Figure 6y.
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The final method we consider is the median-based criterion (and its generalization to
arbitrary quantiles). Even in this case, examples that call into doubt the intuitive appeal
of the two axioms are readily found.
Suppose n = 24, x = (112, 1 + ε, 7111) and y = (112, (6 + ε/6)16, 716), where ε > 0
is small. We have yL = xL and (yH , xH) ∈ SPD but it is by no means clear that
y P x—which is required by WGC—is a reasonable requirement. See Figure 7 for an
illustration.
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Figure 7x. Figure 7y.
As a final example, let n = 4, x = (1, 1, 1+ ε, 3) and y = (1, 1, 2, 3) with a small ε > 0.
It follows that yL ≤ xL and yH ≥ xH but it is not clear that y should be considered at
least as polarized as x, as required by BGS; see Figure 8.
Income
People
1 2 3
1
2
Income
People
1 2 3
1
2
Distribution x Distribution y
Figure 8x. Figure 8y.
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The last two examples are formulated using the median as the basis of partitioning the
population but it is immediate that they generalize easily to arbitrary quantiles. While
the three general methods of defining groups discussed in this section do not exhaust
all possibilities, it appears that the method employed in the examples can be used to
generate analogous examples for arbitrary ways of assigning partitions to distributions.
Note that the quantiles category encompasses all situations where the set of individuals
above (below) the dividing line is the same in two distributions to be compared, and
situations where people may move from one side to another have been dealt with in the
previous section. We do not present a formal way of defining a pair of examples for each
possible way of defining a partition because, clearly, the examples would have to depend
on the grouping method employed.
IX. Concluding Remarks
Our theorems illustrate that the Foster-Wolfson approach can be given an intuitive
interpretation in terms of viewing polarization as an aggregate of (inverse) welfare indi-
cators of the two groups under consideration. However, the previous two sections have
shown that it seems unlikely to extend these results beyond the limited circumstances of
the model discussed here. Moreover, even the two-group case can be called into question
if the median dividing line (or any quantile-based partitioning of a distribution) fails to
capture the intuitive notion of distinct groups in a distribution. The approach of Esteban
and Ray (1994) and Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004) is subject to analogous observa-
tions. As mentioned in the discussion following Axiom 1 in Duclos, Esteban, and Ray
(2004), this axiom requires that two opposing effects of a specific change in an income
distribution are always traded off in favor of one direction. Moreover, note that the
additive structure employed in both of these papers already encompasses a prescription
regarding the trade-offs that appear as consequences of certain transfer and dominance
principles. Thus, we conclude that uncontroversial axioms do not appear to generalize
to distributions where we do not have clear and unambiguous ways of definition a pop-
ulation partition that remains the same after a transformation as those employed in the
axiom statements.
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